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I. INTRODUCTION
The influence that expert witnesses have on the outcome of a case
cannot be overstated. An expert witness brings to the courtroom a
long list of credentials that creates an aura of reliability. But an aura
is merely an impression, very often deceptive.' An expert often may
lack expertise in the specific area in which he is testifying,' may base
his opinion on unsupported assumptions, or may rely upon unreliable
data.3 The opponent may fail to challenge these flaws, however, if he
has not diligently examined the expert's testimony. Combined with
the liberality of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the practice of
some courts to permit juries to consider virtually all such testimony,
the expert may appear practically unimpeachable to the jury.'
1. See Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways (In re Air Crash Disaster), 795 F.2d 1230,
1234 (5th Cir. 1986) (expressing cynicism regarding expert witnesses and noting that
professional experts are commonplace). For a discussion of the cynicism expressed in In re Air
Crash Disaster, see infra notes 62-63, and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 87.
3. See infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
4. In re Air Crash Disaster, 795 F.2d at 1234.
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Because a trial is often a battle between experts, a cross-examiner
must understand the Rules regarding expert witnesses if he is to mini-
mize successfully the impact of the expert's testimony. This Com-
ment first examines the treatment of experts prior to the 1975
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Second, it explores the
Rules to determine under what circumstances courts should allow
expert testimony. This Comment also analyzes the areas in which the
Rules allow an expert to testify and the bases upon which an expert
may rest his opinion. Finally, it discusses some useful tools with
which one may challenge the credibility and authoritativeness of an
expert's testimony. This Comment suggests that the liberal applica-
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence by trial courts often induces
them into making imprudent decisions to let expert testimony go to
the jury, and concludes that attorneys need to master the tactical
skills of cross-examining an expert if they expect to counteract the
impact of the expert's testimony.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Prior to the enactment of Rules 702 to 705 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, the common law rule permitted courts to admit expert
testimony if it was "not within the common knowledge of the lay-
man." An expert could announce his opinion only after satisfying a
three-step procedure: First, setting forth his qualifications; second,
setting forth the facts underlying his opinion; and third, explaining
the basis of his opinion.6 The rationale for establishing and sustaining
this three-step procedure focused on assisting the trier of fact. If the
trier of fact rejected the facts, data, or opinions underlying the
expert's opinion, the trier of fact necessarily had to reject the expert's
opinion.7
The common law rule permitted an expert to base his opinions
on specialized knowledge derived from his own knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education.' He could also base his opinions
on firsthand out-of-court observations.9 Finally, the expert could for-
mulate opinions based upon facts, data, or opinions already admitted
or to be admitted into evidence if the expert had actually heard the
5. E.g., Bridger v. Union Ry., 355 F.2d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 1966); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE T 702[02], at 702-8 (1987) [hereinafter J. WEINSTEIN].
6. Rossi, Modern Evidence and the Expert Witness, LITIGATION, Fall 1985, at 18.
7. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring
Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 59 (citing 2 J. WIGMORE,
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 680 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1979)).
8. Id. at 58.
9. Id.
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information at trial, or if it was presented to the .expert in the form of
a hypothetical question.' 0
Courts closely scrutinized the reports and examinations of others
if the expert had relied upon them to form his own opinion." Any
opinion grounded on hearsay was "fatally tainted," because of the
presumption that hearsay is inherently unreliable, absent an exception
to the hearsay rule.' 2
If the expert did not have firsthand knowledge of the situation,
an attorney would elicit the expert's testimony through hypothetical
questions that were based on certain facts admitted into evidence. 13
Generally, courts required that the hypothetical question encompass
facts supported by the evidence material to the proponent's side.' 4
Although the question did not have to encompass all of the facts that
the evidence revealed, if the question omitted any material facts or
contained any facts not supported by the evidence, it was
inadmissible. '5
Courts also utilized the test announced in Frye v. United States16
to determine the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. 1 Frye
involved a systolic blood pressure deception test, introduced through
an expert's testimony, which detected deception and falsehood by the
10. United States v. Miller, 600 F.2d 498 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955 (1979)
(charts introduced into evidence formed the basis of the expert's opinion); Arnold, Federal
Rule of Evidence 703: The Backdoor Is Wide Open, 20 FORUM 1, (1984); Graham, supra note
7, at 58.
11. J. MCELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK 342 (1987).
12. Id.
13. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 41 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
14. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 791 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
918 (1981) (Requiring the hypothetical question to encompass all facts led to awkward
results.) (citing United States v. Sessin, 84 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1936)); Harris v. Smith, 372
F.2d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 1967) (The hypothetical question must be based upon facts rather than
upon other expert opinion.); Simpson v. Skelly Oil Co., 371 F.2d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 1967)
(Facts stated in the hypothetical question must be supported in evidence, but need not include
all facts shown in evidence.). But see Ramsey v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 393 F.2d 41, 44
(7th Cir. 1968) (Only those facts required to form the basis of an opinion, not all facts, need to
be included in the hypothetical question.).
15. Grand Island Grain Co. v. Roush Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 391 F.2d 35, 40 (8th Cir.
1968) (If the hypothetical question embraces an important fact not supported by the evidence,
it is defective.); Kale v. Douthitt, 274 F.2d 476, 482 (4th Cir. 1960) (An expert's testimony is
incompetent if based on facts not established by the evidence.).
16. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (The systolic blood pressure deception test had not
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belonged.); see infra notes 105-10
and accompanying text.
17. E.g., United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 754-57 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying the
Frye test to astronomer's testimony purporting to date a photograph by measuring lengths of
shadows in the photograph); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 557 (6th Cir. 1977)
(applying Frye to an accepted scientific technique utilized in a new area).
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rise in one's blood pressure."8 The court held that the test was inad-
missible because it had not "gained general acceptance in the particu-
lar field in which it belongs."' 9 The Frye test provides a method by
which courts avoid the possible prejudicial effects of expert testimony
that is based upon "an unproved hypothesis in an isolated experi-
ment."'20 In accordance with the Frye test, a court must analyze three
factors, through the introduction of other evidence, before admitting
novel scientific evidence: First, the particular scientific community's
evaluation of the scientific principle underlying the proffered novel
evidence; second, the technique applying the scientific principle; and
third, the application of the technique to the case at hand.2
Courts also prohibited an expert from expressing an opinion
upon an ultimate issue in the case because the expert would be
"usurping the province of the jury."' 22 Generally, at common law a
doctor could testify that an accident might or could have caused the
injury, but he could not testify that he thought the accident did cause
the injury.23
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
The 1975 enactment of Rules 702 to 705 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence impelled the courts toward a policy of liberal admission of
18. Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
19. Id. at 1014.
20. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing United States v.
Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977)).
21. This elaboration of Frye was enunciated in Downing, 753 F.2d at 1234 (Once a novel
form of expertise is judicially recognized, the foundational requirement of describing the
principle of the scientific evidence can be eliminated.).
22. United States v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498, 506 (1935) (The ultimate issue is to be
decided by the jury and not to be resolved by opinion evidence.); Mazer v. Security Ins. Group,
368 F. Supp. 418, 422 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (A witness is not permitted to give an opinion as to
an ultimate fact in issue unless the matters involved are beyond the knowledge of the layman.),
aff'd, 507 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975).
23. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 284 (1975).
24. Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
Rule 703 provides: "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence."
FED. R. EVID. 703.
Rule 704 provides: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact." FED. R. EvID. 704.
Rule 705 provides: "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his
1076
CROSS-EXAMINA TION OF EXPERT WITNESSES
expert testimony. Under the Rules, courts no longer prohibit expert
testimony based on hearsay if that hearsay is reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field.25 Furthermore, the Rules no longer
require prior disclosure of the facts, data, or opinions underlying an
expert's opinion. Although hypothetical questions are allowed, they
are no longer required.26 In addition, the Rules abolished the ulti-
mate issue rule, which prohibited experts from giving opinions as to
ultimate facts in issue.27 As promulgated, the Rules grant a propo-
nent of expert testimony, and his expert, wide latitude to introduce
such testimony.28
A. What Do the Rules Require an Expert to Establish Before
Presenting His Opinion?
An expert must first establish that his testimony will assist the
fact finder's understanding of the evidence. 29  Rule 702 does not
require that the subject matter be complex; it requires only that the
expert's testimony assist the jury. 0 Second, the court must make a
reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court
requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or
data on cross-examination." FED. R. EvID. 705.
25. See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
26. In Smith v. Ford Motor Co., the court stated that Rules 703 and 705 were enacted in
response to criticism that the hypothetical question was an opportunity for "summing up in
the middle of the case," a tactic that was both complex and time consuming. 626 F.2d 784,
793 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981). The hypothetical question is often
either too wordy or too one-sided. Id.
27. See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 378
(4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985) (The trial court has wide discretion in
admitting expert testimony bearing on the ultimate issues in the case.); United
Telecommunications, Inc. v. American Television and Communications Corp., 536 F.2d 1310
(10th Cir. 1976) (Expert testimony was admitted to determine the meaning of "best efforts" in
registration covenants even though it went to the ultimate issue in the case.).
28. See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
29. See Graham, supra note 7, at 47.
30. Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052, 1055 (4th Cir. 1986) (Expert's
testimony was wrongly admitted by the trial court because it only repeated what was common
knowledge and common sense.); Otwell v. Motel 6, Inc., 755 F.2d 665, 667 (8th Cir. 1985)
(Expert testimony excluded because the jury had sufficient evidence from other sources to
make a decision.); Zimmer v. Miller Trucking Co., 743 F.2d 601, 604 (8th Cir. 1984) (The jury
was competent to make a decision without superfluous expert opinion.); Garwood v.
International Paper Co., 666 F.2d 217, 223 (5th Cir. 1982) (Testimony of a human factors
engineer offered against a claim of contributory negligence was excluded because it would not
aid the jury in determining the facts.); United States v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 416 F.
Supp. 313, 315 (D.N.J. 1976) (The purpose of expert testimony is to assist the trier of fact to
understand, evaluate, and decide the complex evidentiary materials in the case.); see also Inker,
A Practical Guide to Using Expert Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, PRAC.
LAW., July 15, 1985, at 21, 22 ("The focus under the Rules is on the propensity of an expert's
testimony to assist the factfinder, rather than on the complexity of the subject matter being
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preliminary determination under Rule 104(a) that the witness is quali-
fied to give an expert opinion.31 Pursuant to Rule 702, a witness may
qualify as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or edu-
cation. The focus is on the witness' actual qualifications, rather than
his title.3 2 Thus, anyone with specialized knowledge may qualify as
an expert in that particular area.
B. Upon What May the Expert Base His Opinion?
An expert may base his opinion on the following: First, on his
scientific, technical, and other specialized knowledge derived from his
education and experience; second, on his firsthand out-of-court obser-
vation of facts; third, on facts, data, or opinions already admitted, or
to be admitted, into evidence and presented to the expert at trial
either by hypothetical questions or by the expert actually hearing the
testimony; and fourth, on facts, data, or opinions not admitted into
evidence but presented to the expert outside the courtroom and rea-
sonably33 relied on by experts in the particular field.34
The modem view consequently allows experts to rely on data
supplied by third parties because experts commonly rely on this type
of information when forming an opinion. As opposed to the common
law standard, under which the expert's opinion was inadmissible if it
went beyond the evidence in the case, Rule 703 allows the opinion to
presented."); Rossi, supra note 6, at 19 (Testimony is appropriate if the expert's opinion will
assist the trier of fact.).
31. Rule 104(a) provides:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making
its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with
respect to privileges.
FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
Such a determination lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Ellis v. K-Lan
Co., 695 F.2d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 1983); N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 590 F.2d 415, 418 (2d Cir. 1978). Although assisting the jury and presenting a
qualified witness are preliminary determinations to exclude an expert's testimony, there are
also other reasons to exclude the expert's testimony. For example, the basis of his opinion may
be inadequate if experts do not reasonably rely upon it in the particular field, or the scientific
evidence does not satisfy the Frye test. See infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
32. Will v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 544, 548 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (The crucial
factors with respect to admissibility of expert testimony are the actual experience of the
witness and the probative value of his opinion.); J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 5, 702[04], at 702-
25.
33. The word "reasonable" includes two factors: First, whether it is customary in the
expert's field to rely on this extraneous information; and, second, if it is customary to rely on
this information, the judge must decide whether the custom is a reasonable one. Younger,
Expert Witnesses, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 267, 279 (1981).
34. Graham, supra note 7, at 64.
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go beyond the evidence admitted at trial as long as, the facts or data
are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences.35 The expert must establish that
he, as well as others, use the particular information for purposes other
than testifying in a lawsuit.36 Evidence will not be admitted if the
expert who is testifying is the only one who customarily relies upon
the material, or if he has relied upon the material solely to prepare for
litigation.37
Courts are split in their treatment of Rule 703's reasonable reli-
ance requirement. The liberal view favors admissibility if the facts are
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field,
thereby allowing the jury to decide whether to accept or reject the
basis of the expert's opinion. 31 The restrictive view, in contrast,
35. Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 851 (6th Cir. 1981) (An expert's
opinion can rely on types of data normally relied upon to form similar opinions even if the
information is otherwise inadmissible.); Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550, 553 (7th
Cir. 1980) (Evidence need not be independently admissible as long as the evidence is of a type
reasonably relied upon by other experts in the field.); American Bearing Co. v. Litton Indus.,
540 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (Expert testimony should be excluded if misleading and
speculative and not of a type reasonably relied upon in the particular field.), aff'd, 729 F.2d
943 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 854 (1984).
Trial courts must make a factual inquiry and finding as to what data is found reliable by
experts in the field. Insofar as the trial court substitutes its own views of reasonable reliance
for those of experts, its determinations are subject to review for legal error. E.g., Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. (In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig.), 723 F.2d
238, 277 (3d Cir. 1983); see also American Bearing Co., 540 F. Supp. at 1169 (The question as
to whether the facts or data are of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field is a matter to be determined by the court.).
A trial court's inquiry into whether this standard is satisfied must be made on a case-by-
case basis and should focus on the reliability of the opinion and its foundation rather than
merely on the fact that it was based upon hearsay. E.g., Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d
498, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1983).
36. See J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 5, 703[03], at 703-17.
37. FED. R. EvID. 703.
38. Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1980) (Admissibility is
irrelevant; the relevant inquiry is whether the evidence is of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field.); see also Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 853
(6th Cir. 1981) (An expert is allowed considerable latitude in determining the basis of his
opinions, although it is ultimately up to the jury whether to accept his opinion.). In Mannino,
the court stated:
The purpose of Rule 703 is to make available to the expert all of the kinds of
things that an expert would normally rely upon in forming an opinion, without
requiring that these be admissible in evidence .... In short, through Rule 703,
the law is catching up with the realities of professional life.
Mannino, 650 F.2d at 851. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Williams, acknowledged that
Rule 703, in effect creates another exception to the hearsay rule and explained the reasoning
behind such an exception:
The rationale for this exception to the rule against hearsay is that the expert,
because of his professional knowledge and ability, is competent to judge for him-
self the reliability of the records and statements on which he bases his expert
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1073
imposes an additional requirement on the reasonable reliance stan-
dard: A court must reassess the facts, data, or opinions that form the
basis of the expert's opinion to determine if they are sufficiently trust-
worthy for experts reasonably to rely upon them.39 The majority of
courts have adopted the liberal approach in applying this standard
and allow experts to rely on media accounts,' library research,4' and
consumer complaints. 2
Rule 703 allows disclosure of otherwise hearsay evidence to illus-
opinion. Moreover, the opinion of expert witnesses must invariably rest, at least
in part, upon sources that can never be proven in court. An expert's opinion is
derived not only from records and data, but from education and from a lifetime
of experience. Thus, when the expert witness has consulted numerous sources,
and uses that information, together with his own professional knowledge and
experience, to arrive at his opinion, that opinion is regarded as evidence in its
own right and not as hearsay in disguise.
447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954, reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 1048
(1972).
39. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., the court set forth the following
list of factors to be used in determining the reasonableness of reliance under Rule 703:
(1) The extent to which the opinion is pervaded or dominated by reliance
on materials judicially determined to be inadmissible, on grounds of either
relevance or trustworthiness;
(2) The extent to which the opinion is dominated or pervaded by reliance
upon other untrustworthy materials;
(3) The extent to which the expert's assumptions have been shown to be
unsupported, speculative, or demonstrably incorrect;
(4) The extent to which the materials on which the expert relied are within
his immediate sphere of expertise, are of a kind customarily relied upon by
experts in his field in forming opinions or inferences on that subject, and are not
used only for litigation purposes;
(5) The extent to which the expert acknowledges the questionable
reliability of the underlying information, thus indicating that he has taken that
factor into consideration in forming his opinion;
(6) The extent to which reliance on certain materials, even if otherwise
reasonable, may be unreasonable in the peculiar circumstances of the case.
Zenith, 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1330 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
The court noted that Rules 403, 702, or 703 will control admissibility: "Despite the vari-
ety of procedural contexts and variety of F.R.E. pigeonholes, they indicate that the assump-
tions which form the basis for the expert's opinion, as well as the conclusions drawn therefrom,
are subject to rigorous examination." Id. at 1328; see also Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 574 F. Supp. 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Expert testimony was excluded because estimates
were based on contradictory factual assumptions or were unsupported by the record.), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984).
40. Gregory v. South Hills Movers, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (The expert
could reasonably rely upon professional discussion based upon published accounts of an
athlete's knee injuries.).
41. Bauman v. Centex Corp., 611 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1980) (The expert could rely in part
on research done in a university library.).
42. Norris v. Gatts, 738 P.2d 344, 351 (Alaska 1987) (Consumer complaint reports con-
cerning automobile runaways made to automobile manufacturer and National Highway Traffic
Safety Agency were the type of information reasonably relied upon by experts.).
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trate the basis of an expert's opinion,43 but such testimony is not
admissible to establish substantive facts in the case."4 Counsel there-
fore may not argue that the fact exists independently. The end result,
however, is that if the expert based his opinion on another expert's
opinion, the latter's opinion will be admitted through the former's
testimony.45
As discussed earlier, Rule 704 abrogates the ultimate issue rule,46
which prohibited an expert from testifying on ultimate issues because
it was believed that the expert would usurp the province of the jury by
so testifying. The rationale behind the abrogation of the requirement
was that jurors did not have to accept the expert's opinion. The
advisory committee note to Rule 704 states that the Rule prohibiting
expert opinions from going to ultimate issues was unduly restrictive,
difficult to apply, and served only to deprive the trier of fact of useful
information. 48  Rule 704 is not without its limits, however, and the
use of the expert's opinion must be consistent with Rule 702's "assist
the trier of fact" standard, as well as Rule 403's concerns regarding
the balance between probative value and the risk of unfair prejudice.49
Together, these Rules safeguard against the admission of testimony
that only tells the jury the result to reach, and also against testimony
43. Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1978). The Fifth
Circuit stated: "Rules 703 and 705 codify the approach of this and other circuits that permits
the disclosure of otherwise hearsay evidence for the purpose of illustrating the basis of the
expert witness' opinion. Courts have even permitted the admission of hearsay opinion on the
ultimate issue if some guarantee of trustworthiness existed." Id. (citations omitted).
44. Inker, supra note 30, at 29; see also Fox v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 694 F.2d
1349, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983) (Under Rule 703, an expert-is permitted to disclose hearsay for the
limited purpose of explaining the basis of the expert opinion, but not as general proof of the
underlying matter.); Hickok v. G.D. Searle & Co., 496 F.2d 444, 447 (10th Cir. 1974) (The
expert may testify concerning published materials only to establish the basis of his opinion, but
not for the purpose of establishing the truth of the materials.). But see John Bean, 566 F.2d at
545 (Hearsay evidence disclosing the basis of an expert witness' opinion should be admissible
to impeach if strictly limited to that purpose by instruction and if the judge finds that the
evidence possesses a sufficient guarantee of reliability.).
45. J. MCELHANEY, supra note 11, at 342-43; see also Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66 (3d
Cir. 1985) (An expert can disclose the substance of a conversation that he had with another
expert if he relied on that discussion.).
46. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
47. E.g., United States v. Morgan, 554 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir.) (Usurping the province of the
jury is a "mere bit of empty rhetoric."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977); see also Graham,
supra note 7, at 49.
48. FED. R. EvID. 704 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 284.
49. See supra note 24. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
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that is phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria. 0 The
Rules, therefore, do not permit an expert to give legal conclusions5 or
to testify as to principles of law to be applied in the case.52
Consistent with the liberal approach that Rules 702 to 704 man-
date, Rule 705 abolishes the requirement of prior disclosure of the
underlying facts and data that form the basis of the expert opinion.
5 3
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE ON
CROSS-EXAMINATION
The Federal Rules of Evidence encourage experts not only
to explain evidence but also to be the source of evidence. Because
Rule 703 countenances the admission of hearsay evidence through
expert testimony, the Rule has been characterized as a "back
door exception" to the general rule against the admission of hear-
say evidence.54 Critics assert that Rule 703 has become, in effect,
"a major exception to the hearsay rule," opening the door to the
admission of unreliable testimony. 5 In O'Gee v. Dobbs Houses,
50. FED. R. EvID. 704 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 285; Graham, supra
note 7, at 50.
51. See Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983) (Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, witnesses may neither tell the jury what results to reach nor give
legal conclusions.).
52. United States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1000
(1981) (An opinion as to the legal implications of the parties' conduct is not admissible.); Marx
& Co. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977) (A lawyer
was qualified as an expert, but should not have been permitted to testify as to the
unreasonableness of the delay of registration statement because it amounted to a legal
conclusion regarding the facts.); see also Patterson, Products Liability Litigation: The Rule
Making Power of Expert Witnesses-Part One, FOR THE DEF., Oct. 1981, at 10. Under Rule
704, experts can opine that a product is "defective" or "unreasonably dangerous," thereby
giving themselves substantive rulemaking powers. Experts often apply standards of defect and
unreasonably dangerous that are substantially different from the legal meanings of these terms,
thereby misleading and confusing the jury. Such opinions should be excluded under Rule 704
because they are "phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria." Id., at 10.
53. For the rationale of the common law rule requiring prior disclosure, see supra text
accompanying note 7.
54. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 10. But see Rossi, supra note 6, at 23 (The char-
acterization of Rule 703 as a "back door exception" to the hearsay rule may be an
overstatement because the evidence is admitted only to explain the opinion and not as
substantive evidence.).
55. J. MCELHANEY, supra note 11, at 342. Professor Graham has taken the opposite view:
Rule 703 is not a hearsay exception. The court thus may give a limiting
instruction to the jury: jurors may consider the facts, data, and opinions
reasonably relied upon by the expert under Rule 703 in evaluating the basis of the
expert's opinions but not as establishing the truth of the testimony's content. ...
Although for most practical purposes admitting the information as the basis of
an expert's opinion is equivalent to admitting the evidence for its truth under a
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Inc.,6 for example, an expert physician retained solely for litigation
purposes was permitted to testify as to the plaintiff's statements con-
cerning her injuries, and on other doctors' statements to the plaintiff
about her injuries.57 The court allowed this multiple-level hearsay to
be admitted through the physician because he also relied on hospital
records.5 8 The O'Gee court stated that it was not deciding whether
such multiple-level hearsay would have been admissible without the
hospital records.5 9
Pursuant to Rule 703, much if not all of an expert's testimony
may be based on inadmissible evidence. As long as the evidence is
"reasonably reliable," that evidence may be disclosed to the jury.'
Courts have been so liberal with this standard that an expert may
testify to almost anything-as long as it assists the jury.6 Often, that
determination is a difficult one for the judge to make. It requires the
judge to make an evaluation of data with which he may be unfamiliar,
and to deal with a field in which he is not an expert.
Frequently judges admit such evidence, leaving the jury to decide
the weight to be assigned to it. In criticizing this practice, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has recently pointed out
that trial judges should take a more aggressive role in assessing the
qualifications of expert witnesses. The court explained: "Because the
universe of experts is defined only by the virtually infinite variety of
fact questions in the trial courts, the signals of competence cannot be
catalogued. Nevertheless, there are almost always signs both of com-
petence and of the contribution such experts can make to a clear pres-
entation of the dispute. '62 The court cautioned that trial judges
should be wary of certain signals in deciding whether to accept expert
testimony:
First, many experts are members of the academic community who
supplement their teaching salaries with consulting work ...
[M]any such able persons present studies and express opinions that
they might not be willing to express in an article submitted to a
refereed journal of their discipline or in other contexts subject to
peer review .... Second, the professional expert is now common-
hearsay exception, differences remain.... [E]vidence admitted solely to form the
basis of an expert's opinion under Rule 703 will not support a prima facie case.
Graham, supra note 7, at 66.
56. 570 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1978).
57. Id. at 1088.
58. Id. at 1089.
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
61. Rossi, supra note 6, at 21.
62. In re Air Crash Disaster, 795 F.2d at 1234.
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place. That a person spends substantially all of his time consulting
with attorneys and testifying is not a disqualification. But experts
whose opinions are available to the highest bidder have no place
testifying in a court of law, before a jury, and with the imprimatur
of the trial judge's decision that he is an "expert. '63
Although the liberal approach of the Federal Rules of Evidence
has led the majority of courts to allow an expert to testify to virtually
anything," the Rules nonetheless provide a framework by which the
cross-examiner can exclude or weaken the expert's opinion. Because
the combined effect of the Rules is to place the full burden on the
cross-examiner to uncover the bases of the expert witness' opinion,65
the cross-examiner must understand that the Rules allow the cross-
examiner wide latitude regarding the subject matter that he can
attack. 66 The cross-examiner can scrutinize anything to which the
expert has testified during direct examination, as well as matters
regarding his qualifications or the accuracy of his opinion. Exposing
such weaknesses will affect the weight and credibility of the expert's
testimony.67
The opponent must discern which facts and assumptions were
key to the expert's opinion, and attack his testimony by showing that
his conclusion would be different if certain additional facts were
assumed or if certain assumed facts were changed.68 A court may
exclude testimony, for example, if there is no evidence to support the
facts underlying the hypothetical question to which the expert
responded. 69 Furthermore, an appellate court can reverse a verdict if
the essential facts upon which the expert based his testimony were
63. Id.
64. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
65. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 792-94 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
918 (1981) (Because the cross-examiner bears the burden of exploring the facts underlying the
expert testimony, advance knowledge of these facts through pretrial discovery is essential.);
Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Since rule 705
shifts to the cross-examiner the burden of eliciting the bases of an expert witness' opinion,
otherwise hearsay evidence that reveals the underlying sources of the expert's opinion should
be as permissible on cross-examination as on direct.").
66. N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 590 F.2d 415, 421
(2d Cir. 1978) (An "unduly harsh limitation on cross-examination of a key expert witness can
amount to prejudicial error.").
67. E.g., Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907
(1976) (Any weakness in the underpinnings of the expert's opinion goes to the weight and
credibility of the testimony.).
68. E.g., Cunningham v. Gans, 507 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1974).
69. E.g., Larue v. National Union Elec. Corp., 571 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1978) (striking the
expert's opinion because there was no independent basis for the hypothetical fact on which the
expert's opinion was based).
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contrary to the facts proven in the case.7"
A. Goal #1: Intercept the Expert Testimony
The first goal of the cross-examiner is to intercept the testimony
before the jury receives it. He may achieve this goal by resorting to
Rule 104(a)," which allows the trial court to make preliminary deter-
minations as to the admissibility of the testimony.72 The opponent
can also voir dire the expert regarding these preliminary issues.73 A
cross-examiner may move to exclude the expert's testimony if the tes-
timony does not assist the trier of fact, or if the witness is not qualified
to testify as an expert. These preliminary determinations are within
the trial court's discretion, and appellate courts will review them only
upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.74
Courts will exclude expert testimony if it does not assist the trier
of fact.75 Testimony is unhelpful to the jury if it is cumulative, 76 con-
jectural, speculative,77 or within the jury's common knowledge.78
70. Georgia Kaolin Int'l v. M/V Grand Justice, 644 F.2d 412, 417 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)
(The trial court's judgment was reversed because assumptions upon which expert testimony
was based were contrary to proven facts.).
71. For the text of Rule 104(a), see supra note 31.
72. Arnold, supra note 10, at 9.
73. Graham, supra note 7, at 59.
74. United States v. Haro-Espinosa, 619 F.2d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1979) (The question of
whether the witness is qualified as an expert is a preliminary fact to be determined by the
court.); see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
75. Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 849 (6th Cir. 1981) (Rule 703
should be broadly interpreted, and in determining the expert's qualifications the judge should
only evaluate whether the expert's knowledge of the subject matter is such that his opinion is
likely to assist the jury in arriving at the truth.).
76. Haynes v. American Motors Corp., 691 F.2d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1982) (Expert
testimony was excluded because it was cumulative in light of the fact that substantial
testimony had already been introduced on the issue.).
77. If the court then finds that the basis of the expert's opinion is inadequate, the court can
strike the testimony as based upon conjecture or speculation. Graham, supra note 7, at 68; see
also Newman v. Hy-Way Heat Sys., Inc., 789 F.2d 269, 270 (4th Cir. 1986) (An expert's
testimony regarding causation of plaintiff's injuries was struck because it was based on
speculative assumptions rather than evidence in the case.); Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289,
1292-93 (8th Cir. 1975) (An expert's testimony projecting future inflationary trends to estimate
the decedent's lost future earnings was too speculative and conjectural, and thus lacked
sufficient probative value to outweigh the danger that it would lead the jury to assess damages
on an improper basis.), aff'd sub nom. Johnson v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 586 F.2d 1291
(8th Cir. 1978); American Bearing Co. v. Litton Indus., 540 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(The method of the expert's calculation was inaccurate and should have been excluded because
it was misleading and speculative.), aff'd, 729 F.2d 943 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 854
(1984).
78. In Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1986), the plaintiff offered
an expert in "human factors" to testify that persons wearing heels tend to avoid walking on
grates. Id. at 1055. The court found that the testimony did not assist the jury and simply
repeated what is common knowledge and common sense. Id. The court stated:
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Testimony does not assist the trier of fact if it does not help the jury
resolve a controversial issue.79 Courts must engage in a Rule 403
analysis in such a situation, thereby excluding the evidence if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.80 This analysis
requires the court to view the evidence "in the light most favorable to
the proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its
prejudical effect."'" The liberality of the Rules indicates that courts
generally will resolve all doubts concerning the utility of an expert's
Though we would normally defer to the exercise by the district court of its
judgment, Rule 702 makes inadmissible expert testimony as to a matter which
obviously is within the common knowledge of jurors because such testimony,
almost by definition, can be of no assistance. At the same time, the admission of
such testimony, though technical error, will almost invariably be harmless....
Trouble is encountered only when the evaluation of the commonplace by an
expert witness might supplant a jury's independent exercise of common sense.
This, however, does not seem to be an inquiry under Rule 702, but rather a
necessary, independent inquiry under Rule 403 to exclude evidence which is
prejudicial.
Id. (citations omitted).
79. Ellis v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 738 F.2d 269, 270 (8th Cir. 1984) (Expert testimony
regarding proper action for a driver just prior to the accident was excluded because the expert
was in no better position than the jury to determine the answer.). In Strong v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1981); the court excluded expert testimony under Rule
704 because the jury was capable of drawing its own inferences from the available evidence.
Id. at 686. The court held that the question whether the lack of a warning rendered a product
unreasonably dangerous was not the kind of issue on which expert assistance is essential to the
trier of fact. Id.
80. In Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 646 F. Supp. 1420 (E.D. Tex. 1986), aff'd, 826 F.2d 420
(5th Cir. 1987), the court performed a Rule 403 balancing test and excluded the testimony of
two experts because the data they relied upon to form their opinions was so unreliable and
lacking in probative value that it could not serve as a basis upon which a reasonable expert
could base his opinion. One expert diagnosed the plaintiff's condition by relying solely on the
plaintiff's oral history, without having examined him. The fact that this expert had a
"preconceived theory," coupled with the fact that the only support for his contention was a
single published article, was sufficient for the court to exclude his testimony. Id. at 1424-25.
The other expert had no specialized training in the particular field and relied on research by
-another person whose qualifications were unclear. It was also uncertain as to what
examination he had performed on the plaintiff. Id. at 1425.
The court reasoned that both experts had sought employment from the plaintiff's
attorneys, and therefore, the experts did not view the plaintiff's condition objectively. Id. The
court further found that the proffered expert testimony so lacked in probative value that it felt
compelled to exclude such testimony under Rule 403. Id. at 1426. The court stated: "There is
a great possibility of misleading the jury through the creation of a false aura of scientific
infallibility through the use of such testimony." Id.; see also Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 574 F. Supp. 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (excluding expert testimony under Rules
703 and 403 because it was unsupported and internally inconsistent), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984).
81. E.g., In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prod. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp.
1212, 1242 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
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testimony in favor of admissibility. 2 The rationale for this approach
is that the jury is capable of ignoring unhelpful evidence.83
An expert's qualifications are also subject to preliminary attack
under Rule 104(a). A cross-examiner may, therefore, discredit the
witness by showing that the witness is not qualified to testify as an
expert;84 i.e., that he does not have the requisite knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education. The following is a possible line of
cross-examination:
Q: Do you belong to any organization?
8 5
Q: Are you a member of the organization simply because
you pay dues?
Q: Is your certification limited in time?
Q: Are you currently certified?
Q: Have you practiced in the relevant area of expertise? 6
A variation of the above approach is to argue that the witness is
not qualified to express an opinion on the particular subject at issue.8"
82. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 5, $ 702[02], at 702-14. But see In re Air Crash Disaster, 795
F.2d at 1234 (asserting that courts should refrain from exercising extreme liberality in
admitting expert testimony).
83. Singer Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 579 F.2d 433, 443 (8th Cir. 1978) ("[I]t
is now for the jury, with the assistance of vigorous cross examination, to measure the worth of
the opinion."); J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 5, 702[02], at 702-14 to -15.
84. This approach can be risky, however, for two reasons. First, because Rule 702 is
extremely broad, the witness may qualify as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education. Thus, it may be difficult to impugn his expertise. Second, juries often identify
with the expert more than with the attorney. Thus, unless one has a reasonable assurance of
success, one risks alienating the jury by attacking the expert. J. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY 339
(1975).
85. But see Tank v. C.I.R., 270 F.2d 477, 486 (6th Cir. 1959) (The absence of certificates,
memberships, and the like, does not in and of itself detract from the competency of an expert.).
86. Adapted from an example in Dombroff, Prepare and Present Your Expert Witness, FOR
THE DEF., Aug. 1984, at 15.
87. Will v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 544, 548 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (excluding
doctor's testimony because he was not an expert on a particular drug and had no knowledge of
studies conducted on the drug); Larsen v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 87 F.R.D. 602, 607
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (excluding witness' testimony because he lacked expertise on the particular
subject matter and because the danger of confusing the issue and misleading the jury
substantially outweighed the probative value of the testimony); Poland v. Beaird-Poulan, 483
F. Supp. 1256, 1259 (W.D. La. 1980) ("One cannot testify as an expert in regard to a
mechanism if he has not had ample opportunity to practically apply his field of expertise to the
mechanism at issue.").
A proffered expert must have a special fitness to answer questions in the field of expertise
about which he proposes to testify. With regard to this point, Professor Wigmore stated:
The capacity is in every case a relative one, i.e. relative to the topic about
which the person is asked to make his statement. The object is to be sure that the
question to the witness will be answered by a person who is fitted to answer it.
His fitness, then, is a fitness to answer on that point. He may be fitted to answer
about countless other matters, but that does not justify accepting his views in the
matter in hand.
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The cross-examiner may discredit the witness, a physician in the fol-
lowing example, by narrowing or pinpointing his expertise in the fol-
lowing manner.
Q: You are an internist, is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: What type of training do you need to become an
internist?
A: Four years of medical school and three years of residency
in internal medicine.
Q: What does an internist do?
A: Well, I deal with general internal medicine. That is,
treating the pathology of every organ system in the human body on
a primary care level.
Q: What does primary care mean?
A: Primary care, as opposed to a speciality level, means that
if serious problems occur, I may consult a specialist in that area.
Q: So Doctor, if a patient had serious liver problems, you
would refer him to, or you would consult, a hepatologist, is that
correct?
A: Yes.
Q: What is a cardiologist?
A: Someone who is a specialist in diseases of the heart.
Q: What type of training do cardiologists need?
A: Four years of medical school, three years of residency in
internal medicine and an additional two or three year fellowship of
cardiology training.
Q: Have you had those additional years of cardiology
training?
A: No.
Q: Are you a cardiologist?
A: No, I am not.
2 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 555 (3d ed. 1940).
88. The following hypothetical will be used through the remainder of this Comment to
illustrate specific cross-examination techniques. Assume that an 18-year-old, Jeff, was in a
serious car accident and has sued the manufacturer of the car. Jeff alleges that the car's seat
belt system was defective, and that this defect aggravated his injuries. While recovering in
hospital, Jeff has an electrocardiogram (EKG). Jeff's medical expert testifies that he spots an
arrhythmia in the EKG-that is, deviations from the normal rhythm of the heart. The
physician further testifies that the impact of the steering wheel on Jeff's chest caused the
arrhythmia. He also testifies that the arrhythmia could get worse and cause serious heart
problems for Jeff in the future.
The defense expert will testify that the arrhythmia could have been congenital, and that it
has gone undetected due to the fact that the plaintiff is asymptomatic; i.e., without symptoms.
In addition, he will opine that the arrhythmia will probably never develop into a serious
problem and that Jeff's life span will not be shortened.
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By clarifying an expert's true area of expertise, the cross-exam-
iner can show that the particular area is not directly applicable to the
issue on which the expert is testifying.89 By showing that the witness
is not qualified to testify as an expert on the issue at hand, the cross-
examiner may have the testimony excluded, or at least reduce the wit-
ness' credibility.
B. Goal #2. Reduce the Weight and Credibility
of the Expert Testimony
The Rules allow an expert to base his opinion on facts, data, or
opinions derived from firsthand out-of-court observation, from infor-
mation admitted into evidence, or from information not admitted into
evidence, but presented to the expert out of court.90 By attacking the
basis underlying the expert's opinion, the cross-examiner can reduce
the weight the jury may attach to the expert's opinion. Various
screening devices, such as those discussed below, are available to
break down the inherent aura of reliability that juries tend to attach to
an expert's testimony.
1. FIRSTHAND OUT-OF-COURT OBSERVATION
An expert may base his opinion on personal knowledge or per-
sonal observation if it is shown that he has sufficient knowledge of the
facts to enable him to form an opinion.9' The classic example of an
expert with firsthand out-of-court observation is a treating physician.
Even an examining physician can fit into this category. The cross-
examiner should attempt to diminish the credibility of the examining
physician by demonstrating the limited scope of the physician's per-
sonal knowledge as follows:
Q: Doctor, if a man whom you had never met called you on
the telephone and described a series of symptoms, you would not
89. T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 289 (1980). In Hartke v.
McKelway, the court found that the expert was not competent to express an opinion on
defendant's due care or lack of due care and that the court should not have allowed her to
testify about the standard of care for laproscopic cauterization, a procedure used to prevent
pregnancy in the future. 526 F. Supp. 97, 101 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983). Her knowledge of the standard of care with respect to
treatments involving the fallopian tubes did not extend to knowledge of the standard of care
for sterilization by the laproscopic cauterization procedure. She had no training or experience
with that procedure. Id. at 101. But see Payton v. Abbott Labs, 780 F.2d 147, 155 (1st Cir.
1985) (The fact that a physiciin is not a specialist in the field in which he is testifying affects
the weight that the jury might place on the expert's opinion, but not its admissibility.).
90. Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Though courts have
afforded experts a wide latitude in picking and choosing the sources on which to base opinions,
Rule 703 nonetheless requires courts to examine the reliability of those sources.").
91. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
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feel very comfortable prescribing a course of treatment for acute
gall bladder attack, would you?
A: No.
Q: We can agree that in the field of medicine, there usually is
no subsititute for actually examining a patient when it comes to
making a diagnosis. Is that correct?
A: Yes, most of the time.
Q: And Doctor, you are not telling this judge and this jury
that you were actually in the emergency room of General Hospital
when Jeff was brought in, are you?92
A: No, I was not.
Q: In fact, you did not examine him that night at all, did
you?
A: No.
Q: And you were not with Doctor Brown when he visited
Jeff the next morning, were you?
A: No.
Q: And when Jeff left the hospital, you didn't examine him,
did you?
A: No.
Q: The fact is, you have never examined Jeff, have you?
A: No.
Q: And everything you have told the judge and jury about
your expert opinion is based on reading the EKG or from what the
plaintiff has told you himself, is it not?
A: Yes.
Q: And not based on any examination by you?
A: Correct.9 3
If the expert has employed scientific techniques or is testifying on
scientific methods, the proffered scientific evidence must possess an
indicia of trustworthiness and reliability.9 Such evidence must satisfy
the Frye test, requiring that the scientific technique have "gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
95
2. FACTS, DATA, AND OPINIONS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE
An expert can base his opinion upon facts to which other wit-
nesses have testified at trial.96 This category includes documents,
92. See supra note 88.
93. Adapted from an example in J. McELHANEY, supra note 11, at 373.
94. See infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
96. Kibert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566, 570 (4th Cir. 1967) (An expert is permitted to take
into account the testimony of others as to what they observed.).
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exhibits, facts, data, and opinions admitted through other witnesses.
The expert may base his opinion on certain assumptions or facts
advanced at the trial, commonly elicited by a hypothetical question or
heard by the expert in attendance at the trial. Opposing counsel
should pinpoint exactly which facts the expert has relied upon and
which facts the expert has omitted in arriving at his opinion.9
Opposing counsel may also rebut the expert's opinion by revealing
incorrect or inadequate factual assumptions, or by showing that the
expert used incorrect or inadequate reasoning in reaching his conclu-
sions.98 The cross-examiner should modify the facts given to the
expert to determine if his opinion changes. He could ask, "What if
fact X was not true?" The cross-examiner also may ask his own
hypothetical, which, if properly formulated, is likely to elicit a
response favorable to the cross-examiner. For example:
Q: In giving your opinion that the impact caused the
arrythmia, you were assuming that no arrythmias existed prior to
that accident.
A: Yes, because the plaintiff testified that he never felt palpi-
tations prior to the accident.
Q: It is possible that the plaintiff has had these palpitations
since birth but has not been aware of themn before, isn't that
correct?
A: It is possible.
Q: Were these EKG readings compared to prior EKG
readings?
A: No, because the patient has never had an EKG per-
formed prior to this accident.
Q: Isn't it true, Doctor, that a prior EKG may have shown
an arrythmia?
A: We don't know. It could have.
Q: Isn't it true, Doctor, that had a prior EKG been done, it
may have shown arrythmias without the patient having any symp-
toms signaling this abnormality?
A: Yes.
97. According to one scholar, "Whenever facts are added or changed, the onus for their
omission or inaccuracy should be placed squarely upon opposing counsel, by asking the
witness whether he had been advised by [opposing counsel] that the additional fact exists or
that the assumed fact was disputed." J. JEANS, supra note 84, at 334.
98. Faries v. Atlas Truck Body Mfg. Co., 797 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 1986) (A police
officer's expert testimony as to the cause of an accident was inadmissible because it was not
supported by sufficient evidence.); Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 208
(2d Cir. 1984) (excluding testimony under Rule 703 because the expert's assumptions and
assertions were unrealistic, contradictory, and "riddled with errors"); Mims v. United States,
375 F.2d 135, 145 (5th Cir. 1967) (Expert testimony was not conclusive because several of the
material factual assumptions were incorrect.).
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Q: If the plaintiff was incorrect in believing that he had
never had palpitations before, your opinion would be incorrect too?
A: That is correct.
3. FACTS, DATA, AND OPINIONS NOT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE
An expert may base his opinion on information presented to him
outside the courtroom or even outside his own perception. This
otherwise inadmissible evidence is admitted if the information is of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.99 This category
encompasses the kind of information that experts rely upon profes-
sionally when forming opinions." An expert may not base his opin-
ion on statistics that were prepared for litigation but did not form part
of an independent study;' 0 1 on affidavits based upon unsupported
assumptions; 10 2 or on testimony of parties and witnesses at the scene
of the accident. 103
If the court finds that experts in the field reasonably rely on the
evidence used by the expert witness, opposing counsel may attempt to
establish that the expert's opinion nonetheless is unreliable. Thus,
although it may be reasonable for a physician to rely upon statements
made to him by his patient, the cross-examiner may choose to portray
99. See sources cited supra note 35.
100. E.g., Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1978) (The
modern view of evidence is that experts may rely on data supplied by third parties.); United
States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[W]hen the expert witness has
consulted numerous sources, and uses the information, together with his own professional
knowledge and experience, to arrive at his opinion, that opinion is regarded as evidence in its
own right and not as hearsay in disguise."), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954, reh'g denied, 405 U.S.
1048 (1972); see also FED. R. EvIo. 703 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 283 (The
rule is designed to bring judicial practice into line with the practice of experts themselves when
not in court.).
101. Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 503 (5th Cir. 1983) (An expert's statistics
were inadmissible because they were not shown to be of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the field, were prepared strictly in anticipation of litigation, were based on
information received from a sister corporation, and did not form part of a published study.).
102. Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248, 261-62 (3d Cir. 1984)
(An economist's affidavit relied upon to avoid summary judgement was properly ignored by
the trial court because it expressed opinions based on unsupported factual assumptions.), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985).
103. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co. v. Stegall, 659 F.2d 721, 722 (6th Cir. 1981) (A
trooper's testimony was not admitted because it was based primarily on the story of a biased
eyewitness.). But see American Universal Ins. Co. v. Falzone, 644 F.2d 65, 66 (1st Cir. 1981)
(A fire marshal's testimony based upon information from other fire marshals on the inspection
team was admissible because it was reasonable to rely on contemporaneous, on-the-scene
opinions of experienced investigators.).
The advisory committee has also specified that under Rule 703, it is not reasonable to rely
upon opinions of an "accidentologist" regarding the point of impact in an automobile collision
if the opinions are based on the statements of bystanders. FED. R. EViD. 703 advisory
committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 284.
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such a statement as being unreliable."°
V. ATTACKING THE VALIDITY OF THE EXPERT'S BASIS
By exposing the basis underlying the expert's opinion, the cross-
examiner can attack the validity of each element of the basis that con-
tributed to the expert's opinion. The cross-examiner can pinpoint the
flaws, and thereby cast doubt upon the expert's, opinion.
A. The Frye Test
Under the Frye test, proffered scientific evidence must have been
generally accepted in the particular field to which it belongs.105 The
test requires courts to find that the particular scientific method in
question is reliable and that authorities in the discipline generally
accept its reliability.10 6  The Frye test favors the opponent of the
expert testimony because the proponent has the burden of proving
that a clear majority of authorities in the field share the expert's opin-
ion. The test's restrictiveness necessarily results in the rejection of
new scientific methods because novel approaches, by definition, could
not have gained general acceptance.
Within the last decade, courts in more than fifteen jurisdictions
have modified the Frye test,' 7 inferring from the silence of the Fed-
104. T. MAUET, supra note 89, at 289.
105. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In United States v. Brown, 557
F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977), the court stated that four factors are necessary in order to admit the
expert testimony: a qualified expert; a proper subject; conformity to a generally accepted
explanatory theory; and probative value that outweighs possible prejudicial effects. 557 F.2d
at 556. These foundational prerequisites are needed to protect against the possible prejudice
inherent in any expert scientific testimony at trial. As the Sixth Circuit stated: "Because of its
apparent objectivity, an opinion that claims a scientific basis is apt to carry undue weight with
the trier of fact .... In order to prevent deception or mistake and to allow the possibility of
effective response, there must be a demonstrable, objective procedure for reaching the
opinion." Id. at 556 (citing United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975)); see also
United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 1981) ("The trial court should not be
used as a testing ground for theories supported neither by prior control experiments nor by
calculations with indicia of reliability.").
106. Graham, supra note 7, at 56. To determine if the scientific technique or process is
sufficiently reliable, the court will hear expert testimony regarding the scientific principle and
the validity of the scientific technique or process. The court must find that the technique or
process is reliable and that authorities in the discipline generally or substantially accept its
reliability. Id.; United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973) (Courts should
consider the expert's qualifications, the subject of the testimony, the expert's conformance to
generally accepted theories and the testimony's probative value.); see also supra notes 16-21
and accompanying text. But see United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985)
(Acceptance in the scientific community is only one of several factors.).
107. United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45, 49 (4th Cir. 1984) (The proper test is whether the
general scientific hypothesis has substantial acceptance in the relevant discipline.); United
States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d 725, 731 (2d Cir. 1984) (The court must make a discretionary
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eral Rules of Evidence that the requirement of general acceptance is
not absolutely essential.' 08 Some courts have modified the Frye test
by substituting it with a Rule 403 relevancy test, which balances the
probative value of the proffered evidence against the risk of unfair
prejudice. 09 In addition, some courts have modified the Frye test by
requiring that the proffered scientific evidence or method be "substan-
tially accepted" in the field, and that only a recognized minority
accept the specific evidence or method." 0
The main objective of all the above approaches is to ensure that
the expert testimony possesses an indicia of trustworthiness. Both the
scientific test and the methods employing the test, therefore, must be
reliable.
B. Statistics
In an effort to assure the receipt of accurate and reliable evi-
dence, courts will examine an expert's reliance on data,"' studies, 12
polls,' 3 and calculations. 1 4 Opposing counsel may attack statistics
determination that the hypotheses relied upon have substantial acceptance in the discipline.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110 (1985); see also Rossi, supra note 6, at 21 (Courts have abandoned
the Frye test because its restrictiveness is inconsistent with modem evidence concepts favoring
admissibility.).
108. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234-35 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Although the
commentators agree that this legislative silence is significant, they disagree about its
meaning. . . . [W]e conclude that the Federal Rules of Evidence neither incorporate nor
repudiate it.").
109. Weinstein recommends a relevancy test by which the court would conduct an analysis
under Rule 403. Through this analysis the court would assess the probative value of the
proffered evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice to determine its relevance. Under this
proposal, the court would also consider whether the issue for which the scientific evidence is
being offered is a significant issue, whether other proof is available, and whether limiting
instructions would be useful. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 5, 702[03], at 702-18.
110. See sources cited supra note 107.
111. Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 646 F. Supp. 1420 (E.D. Tex. 1986), aff'd, 826 F.2d 420
(5th Cir. 1987).
112. Sheats v. Bowen, 318 F. Supp. 640, 644 (D. Del. 1970) (If an expert relies on a study,
he must establish that he can testify from his own knowledge as to the nature and extent of the
source from which the statistics of the study were gathered.).
113. In Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1980), the court stated: "To
qualify a study or opinion poll for admission into evidence, there must be a substantial showing
of reliability. There must be some showing that the poll is conducted in accordance with
generally accepted survey principles and that the results are used in a statistically correct
manner." Id. at 552 (citing Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751 (3d Cir.
1978)). Because there was uncontradicted testimony that the study was similar to a survey
conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission, the survey "more than satisfied the threshold
inquiry as to whether other experts would rely upon it." Id. at 553; see Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (The weight to be given to a
survey depends on the validity of the procedures and techniques by which the survey was
created and conducted.).
114. United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1981) (The trial court
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and data that an expert relies upon by showing that the data are unre-
liable and lack probative value.'" In addition, even if experts in the
particular field regularly rely upon a particular type of data, the
method used to develop that data may be unreliable."I6 The cross-
examiner may show, for example, that the data do not include all
essential factors,' 17 or that the expert compiled the data solely for liti-
gation purposes.
C. Learned Treatises
Rule 803(18) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides a hearsay
exception for the substantive admissibility of statements contained in
learned treatises.' '9 Physicians customarily rely on authoritative trea-
tises to form the bases of their opinions. Opponents may inquire as to
the sources that were available to the witness, those he used to form
his opinion, and those he neglected. If the expert recognizes the trea-
tises as authoritative, the cross-examiner may use them. 120 Under the
Rules, a cross-examiner may utilize authoritative treatises to contra-
should have excluded the scientific evidence because the method of making the calculations
was not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.); Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 574 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (The expert's calculations lacked
probative value because they were based on unsupported assumptions.), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part on other grounds, 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984).
115. See sources cited supra note 80.
116. Arnold, supra note 10, at 16.
117. Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 504 (5th Cir. 1983) (Information relied on
in statistics failed to include an essential factor.).
118. Id. at 503 (Statistics were ruled to be inadmissible because, in part, they were prepared
strictly in anticipation of litigation.).
119. Rule 803(18) provides as follows:
To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination
or relied upon by him in direct examination, statements contained in published
treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other
science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of
the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the
statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
120. For an analysis of the four basic views as to when authoritative treatises can be used in
cross-examination to contradict or impeach an expert's testimony, see 31 AM. JUR. PROOF OF
FACTS 2D 451 (1982). The author defined the four views as follows:
Under the first view, only those treatises which a witness has specifically
cited during direct examination as supporting his opinion can be used on cross-
examination. The second view provides that when an expert has relied generally
or specifically on authorities during direct examination, he may be cross-
examined on the basis of authorities which are not necessarily the same as those
on which he relied in his direct testimony. According to the third view, an
expert may be cross-examined on the basis of treatises that he has recognized as
authoritative, whether or not he relied on them to form his opinion. Finally, an
expert may be cross-examined under the fourth line of authority using any
treatise that is established as authoritative in an acceptable manner, regardless of
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dict or impeach the witness, regardless of whether the witness relied
upon them. 2 ' Thus, the cross-examination could proceed as follows:
Q: Doctor, you have indicated that arrythmias may be
caused by trauma.
A: That is true.
Q: And that the impact of the steering wheel on Jeff's chest
could be the source of such a trauma?
A: That is right.
Q: Are you familiar, Doctor, with the works of Miller and
Sheldon on detecting and defining arrythmias?
A: Yes, I am.
Q: Doctor, you are aware of the fact that these men are con-
sidered to be experts in their field and that their writings are
authoritative in the area of electrocardiography.
A: Yes, I am.
Q: Doctor, are you not also aware that they state that most
arrythmias are congenital or acquired due to heart disease rather
than by trauma?
A: Yes, I am aware of their point of view.' 22
VI. EXPOSING PERSONAL BIAS OR INTEREST
OF THE EXPERT WITNESS
A common way to discredit the witness personally is by estab-
lishing that he has a bias in favor of, or a personal interest in, the
party for whom he is testifying. Although the attorney knows that
the expert is a hired gun, the jury may not. The cross-examiner
should therefore inquire into the fees charged, whether the fees have
been paid, and the frequency with which the expert testifies for this
party or this attorney. 123 The line of cross-examination could proceed
as follows:
Q: How much did you charge to appear as a witness here
today?
A: I charged $500 for a report.
Q: Is that your regular charge to appear?
A: Yes.
Q: How many times have you testified for the defendant's
attorneys in the last six months?
whether the witness relied on the treatise during direct examination, and
regardless of whether the witness recognizes the treatise as authoritative.
Id.
121. Id.; see also Graham, supra note 7, at 72.
122. Adapted from an example in J. JEANS, supra note 84, at 344.
123. T. MAUET, supra note 89, at 289.
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A: Four times, maybe.
Q: And you charged $500 each time?
A: Yes.
Q: In six months, wouldn't that amount to $2,000?
A: Yes.
Q: How many cases have you examined for defendant's law-
yers in the past six months?
A: Probably three cases per week, for a total of seventy-five
cases.
Q: How much do you charge for an examination?
A: One hundred and fifty dollars.' 24
Q: How many times have you spoken to the defendant's
attorneys about this case?
A: Maybe half a dozen times.
Q: And as recently as yesterday, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And they reviewed the questions they would ask you and
what I might ask you, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Where did this meeting take place?
A: In their office.'
25
VII. THE REQUIREMENT OF A REASONABLE DEGREE OF
SCIENTIFIC, MEDICAL, OR OTHER TECHNICAL
CERTAINTY
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not require absolute certainty
of expert scientific, medical, or other technical testimony. The
expert's explanatory theory, however, must satisfy the "reasonable
degree of certainty" standard.' 26 Thus, the attorney may ask the
expert whether his opinion on that particular issue has a reasonable
degree of scientific, medical, or other technical certainty. Although
this standard is incapable of a precise definition, the standard calls for
conformity with a generally accepted explanatory theory used in the
field to derive the opinions expressed by the expert. 27 By requiring
that an expert's opinion be derived according to a theory substantially
124. Adapted from an example in J. JEANS, supra note 84, at 340.
125. Adapted from an example in J. APPLEMAN, CROSS-EXAMINATION 129 (1963).
126. Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341, 350 (4th Cir. 1982) (Opinion testimony of a
medical expert in a medical malpractice action may not be stated in general terms but must be
stated in terms of a "reasonable degree of medical certainty.").
127. Boose v. Digate, 107 I11. App. 2d 418, 246 N.E.2d 50 (1969). In Boose, the court
stated that reasonable certainty refers to the general consensus of recognized medical thought
and opinion concerning the probability of conditions in the future based on present conditions.
The expert in Boose was unfamiliar with the legal terms that give a medical opinion its legal
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accepted in the particular field, the court ensures a degree of reliabil-
ity that would not be present if the opinion were to be held solely by
that expert. 128 An expert's inability to state his opinion with a reason-
able degree of certainty, however, goes to the weight of his testimony
and not to the statement's admissibility.1 29
VIII. CONCLUSION
According to Rule 702, any witness may qualify as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.1 30  Therefore,
almost anyone may qualify as an expert. And once qualified, an
expert can express opinions going to the ultimate issues in the case. 3 1
In addition, the expert may express his conclusion without expressing
the basis for his opinion, 32 and may base his testimony on hearsay if
the hearsay is reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field. 1
33
Courts have interpreted the Federal Rules of Evidence in such a
manner as to allow experts to testify to virtually anything. Because
juries tend to place a lot of weight on such testimony, courts must
abandon this extreme approach. The Fifth Circuit, consistent with
this view, recently has made its position clear:
[W]e adhere to the deferential standard for review of decisions
regarding the admission of testimony by experts. Nevertheless, we
... caution that the standard leaves appellate judges with a consid-
erable task. We will turn to that task with a sharp eye, particularly
in those instances, hopefully few, where the record makes it evi-
dent that the decision to receive expert testimony was simply
tossed off to the jury under a "let it all in" philosophy. Our
message to our able trial colleagues: it is time to take hold of
perspective. His opinion, however, was not based on guess or surmise. Id. at 423, 246 N.E.2d
at 53.
128. Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 412 (D. Kan. 1984) (excluding expert's
opinion because other experts in the field had not yet accepted the formula upon which he
relied). Professor Graham explains that the "reasonable degree of scientific, medical, and
other technical certainty" standard "responds to a fear that juries might be improperly
influenced by awe of scientific expertise to subordinate their own judgment on a contested issue
of ultimate fact to that of the expert." Graham, supra note 7, at 62. He adds that, "[t]his
consensus requirement reflects values underlying the Frye test of general acceptance." Id.
129. Bean v. United States (In re Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab. Litig.), 533 F. Supp.
567, 578 (D. Colo. 1980) (The fact that the physician could not state with a reasonable degree
of medical certainty that the swine flu vaccine caused plaintiff's illness went to the weight to be
given his testimony, and not to its admissibility.).
130. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
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expert testimony in federal trials.' 34
Because an appellate court will not disturb a trial court's rulings
on expert witnesses unless there is an abuse of discretion, attorneys
must urge judges to follow the Fifth Circuit's message and scrutinize
expert testimony more carefully than they have in the past. In addi-
tion, attorneys must also urge judges to exercise their discretion to
exclude expert testimony when appropriate. Although this approach
may result in minitrials on the admissibility of the expert testimony, it
is nonetheless preferable to the possibility of misleading a jury and
making each case a battleground for experts and cross-examiners.
If the courts continue to follow the liberal approach, however, it
is the duty of the cross-examiner to counteract the effect of the
expert's testimony. The Rules provide a framework by which the
cross-examiner can exclude or weaken the expert's opinion in the eyes
of the jury. The cross-examiner must therefore use the Rules to his
advantage.
LEE WALDMAN MILLER
134. In re Air Crash Disaster, 795 F.2d at 1234.
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